University of Pennsylvania

ScholarlyCommons
Center for Bioethics Papers

Center for Bioethics

May 1988

Professional Arrogance and Public Misunderstanding
Arthur L. Caplan
University of Pennsylvania, caplan@mail.med.upenn.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/bioethics_papers

Recommended Citation
Caplan, A. L. (1988). Professional Arrogance and Public Misunderstanding. Retrieved from
https://repository.upenn.edu/bioethics_papers/38

© The Hastings Center 1988. Reprinted with permission. This article originally appeared in The Hastings Center
Report, Volume 18, Issue 2, May 1988, pages 34-37.
Publisher URL: http://www.thehastingscenter.org
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/bioethics_papers/38
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

Professional Arrogance and Public Misunderstanding
Abstract
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past three years, approximately, half have enacted strong required request policies. These states have
mandated that hospital administrators be responsible for insuring that next-of-kin or legal guardians are
asked about their willingness to donate organs and tissues of the deceased when a death has been
pronounced in a hospital setting.
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Professional Arrogance and
Public Misunderstanding
by Arthur L Caplan

y assessment of the impact of required request
legislation on organ and tissue procurement must
begin by defining required request laws. Of the fortyone states that have passed such laws during the
past three years, approximately half have enacted
strong required request policies. These states have
mandated that hospital administrators be responsible for insuring that next-of-kin or legal guardians
are asked about their willingness to donate organs
and tissues of the deceased when a death has been
pronounced in a hospital setting.
Most strong required request laws, such as those
enacted by Oregon, New York, Massachusetts, and
New Jersey, allow a person other than a physician
to be designated to make requests. These laws also
call for documentation that a request was made and
require health departments to facilitate implementation of the legislation by assisting hospitals in
educating their staffs and by monitoring the impact
of required request legislation on the overall
availability of organs and tissues for transplantation.
In only one state, Kentucky, is there explicit mention
of a penalty for failure to comply with required
request legislation.
The federal government and roughly twenty states
have enacted laws that differ in important respects
from strong required request legislation. Federal law
as well as the laws in states such as California and
Tennessee mandate that hospitals create protocols
through which next-of-kin or legal guardians will
Arthza L Caplan is director of the Caterfor Biomedical
Ethics at the University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN.
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be notified about the possibility of donating organs
or tissues. These "weak required request laws leave
the details of requests and monitoring to individual
hospitals. Perhaps the most significant difference,
however, is that the federal law, which became
effective in November 1987, links the creation of
a donor protocol to continued eligibility for receiving
monies from the Medicare program.
Because of these substantial variations, assessing
the impact of required request legislation is
complicated. Moreover, many state laws have been
in effect for as little as a year or less. The federal
law is simply too new to permit any reliable estimate
of its impact on either hospital practices regarding
organ and tissue procurement or on the overall
availability of organs and tissues for transplantation.
The fact that required request laws have not been
enacted in a social policy vacuum makes this task
all the more complex. Many states have enacted laws
mandating that occupants of automobiles and other
vehicles wear seatbelts. Others have raised the legal
age for purchasing alcohol and/or stiffened
penalties for drunk driving. Still others have lowered
the legal maximum speed for vehicular traffic. Since
automobile and motorcycle accidents account for
a large proportion of those persons whose kidneys,
hearts, and other vital organs could be used for
transplantation, changes in these laws have a direct
impact on the number of persons who die each
year who might serve as organ or tissue donors.
For example, traffic accident fatalities in Minnesota
have declined 10 percent in 198'7 from the numbers
recorded in 1986. Seat belt laws in Great Britain
are believed to have brought about a 15 percent
decrease in fatalities from accidents.
Yet no reliable data exist on the actual number
of persons who could have donated an organ or
a kidney. For all these reasons, it is hard to know
exactly how to respond to anecdotal reports
concerning the impact of required request on the
overall supply of organs and tissues.
My associates and I at the Center for Biomedical
Ethics at the University of Minnesota are currently
conducting a telephone survey of ten states in which
required request laws of one kind or another have
been in effect for more than six months. We have
contacted organ procurement agencies, health
department officials, and representatives of regional
eyebanks to obtain whatever information they can
offer concerning the impact of the new laws.
None of the ten states, including many with
policies of mandatory reporting to health departments, has compiled reliable figures on the number
of vital organs or tissues available before and after
the enactment of required request legislation.
However, those surveyed do report several trends

and problems with required request that shed some
light on the impact of state laws.
Tissue donation, including corneas, skin, bone,
dural tissues, and tendons, has increased dramatically since the enactment of required request laws.
Increases on the order of 200 to 300 percent are
common. While impressive, these numbers ought
to be even greater given the large number of persons
who could donate tissue upon their deaths.
Organ donation has increased from 10 to 20
percent in many states. In others there has been
no increase over the numbers of vital organs
available for transplant prior to required request
laws. The fact that organ donation has remained
constant despite significant decreases in traffic
fatalities provides some evidence that the laws have
had a small positive impact on the supply of organs
available for transplantion.
The primary problem cited by organ procurement
officials, eyebank representatives, and health
department officials has been the inadequacy of
educational efforts directed toward health care
professionals. As one organ procurement official
observed, "if you simply ask relatives about organ
donation by citing the law the consent rate is zero."
No state has provided even a minimally adequate
level of professional education to those who bear
the obligation of making requests for organ
donation. Whether physicians, nurses, or others,
those responsible for asking need training in making
these exceedingly emotion-laden requests.
The other major obstacle noted by the majority
of procurement officials and state health department
representatives is resistance by physicians to
complying with the new laws. Rates of compliance
in many states do not exceed 50 percent Physician
noncompliance appears to be primarily a result of
the resentment held by physicians against nonphysicians, most specifically legislators and bureaucrats,
about being told what they must do. As several health
department officials commented, physicians are not
comfortable requesting organ donation from family
members and are even less comfortable when
confronted by yet another governmental attempt to
regulate the practice of medicine.
One might interpret the problem of physician
noncompliance with required request laws, be they
strong or weak, as evidence supporting Martyn,
Wright, and Clark's position concerning moral,
clinical, and legal problems with required request
legislation. While physicians often do not want to
ask about organ donation, whether the law requires
it or not, very little in the arguments presented by
Martyn, Wright, and Clark about ethical problems
with required request is persuasive.
Their critique of required request legislation is
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prompted by what turns out to be, on closer
examination, several inaccuracies. The authors
maintain that "institutionalizing the identification of
potential organ donors appears to assume a shift
in the physician's clinical attitude SO that willingness
to diagnose or even hasten the diagnosis of brain
death supersedes the incentive to fight for life." It
is hard to imagine a claim about required request
that could be farther from the truth.
In general, both strong and weak versions of
required request laws were enacted as amendments
to -existing *uniform Anatomical Gift legislation.
Strong required request laws are quite specific about
the fact that no requests are to be made until death
has been pronounced. Such versions of the law do
nothing to alter a physician's traditional obligation
to provide care as long as the patient can possibly
benefit. Weak required request laws allow individual
hospitals complete discretion as to the nature of
their protocols for notifying family members of the
option of donation. In neither situation are the
standard requirements for separating the roles of
those who provide treatment and those who
pronounce death in any way altered or weakened.
Moreover, the legal climate pervading American
medicine is hardly conducive to efforts to hasten
death or fudge a brain death diagnosis to obtain
an organ or tissue donor, particularly given the fact
that potential recipients are either unknown or
nearly always awaiting an organ at a different
hospital. Physicians have little economic or
psychological motivation to become involved in timeconsuming and resource-intensive efforts to recover
organs or tissues when the beneficiaries of their
efforts are likely to be transplant teams and their
patients at other hospitals in other states. It is,
therefore, ludicrous to argue that doctors will be
compelled by required request legislation to kill or
murder helpless patients when many of them find
organ procurement a nuisance simply on the
grounds of professional autonomy or the absence
of adequate fiscal or psychological rewards.
The authors also suggest that required request
legislation is morally suspect in that it encourages
dehumanization of the dead, who come to be viewed
only as portable organ and tissue banks. There is
not a smidgen of empirical evidence, anecdotal or
otherwise, mustered in support of this thesis. In
addition, if this claim were true, it would stand as
a convincing argument against all forms of organ
procurement, whether inspired by required request
legislation or any other public policy. If health care
professionals are actually put in an untenable moral
bind due to a genuine "conflict between encouraging
hope (through caregiving) and causing the family
to lose hope (through the donation request)," then

In enacting required request legslation, our
socie@ h & indicated
~
its collectiue desire t b t
giuen the option of organ
and tissue donation as a last act of
for
the dead and their families and as an expression
of concern for those who will die unless more
Organs and tissues are made

no form of organ request is ethically acceptable.
Similarly, assertions about physician insensitivity
to families' needs "to express feelings about the
relationship now lost [as a result of the death of
a loved one]" impugn all forms of soliciting organs
and tissues no matter how tolerant they may be of
professional hesitation about making requests. The
authors fail to perceive that required request will
more likely enable families to make informed
choices about organ donation. The requirement of
a request will allow those who are living to anticipate
the request in advance of a tragedy and make their
wishes known to family members. The routinization
of requests by properly educated health care
personnel enhances the likelihood of autonomous
choice over the haphazard sorts of inquiries that
preceeded the enactment of required request
legislation.
Further, there is absolutely no evidence to warrant
the authors' view that families "reconstruct the events
surrounding a death in the weeks, months, and years
that follow" and "feel that organ donation involved
treating their loved one as object not subject." The
anecdotal evidence that does exist supports a quite
different conclusion.
Organ procurement personnel have repeatedly
indicated that many families express regret weeks,
months, and even years later at not having
considered the option of organ donation, not having
acted on the stated wishes of their deceased loved
one to donate, or having refused a request for
donation. What donor families do desire is to know
what happened as a result of the donation. Often
such follow-up information is not provided in a
timely manner to donor families.
The final inaccuracy is a true howler. Martyn,
Wright, and Clark maintain that in other countries
required request laws "were the first step toward
presumed consent laws." Required request laws are
portrayed as the "edge of the wedge" by which
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voluntarism and altruism will be replaced by the
totalitarianism of state mandated beneficence. This
is sheer nonsense.
None of the fifteen nations that have presumed
consent laws (including most recently Singapore,
which enacted such a law in the fall of 1987) have
previously had any form of required request
legislation. Prior to 1986, the United States was the
only nation to have enacted or even debated a
required request law. While one Canadian province
has enacted required request legislation and some
other nations, such as the United Kingdom and The
Netherlands, are considering proposals, no nation
has moved from a policy of requiring requests to
taking organs and tissues by legislative fiat.
Required request laws emerged as a distinct
alternative to, not a preamble for, presumed consent.
Indeed, many who favored presumed consent laws
for the United States viewed required request as a
step backward rather than as a first step on the road
to their desired public policy objective. Whatever the
ethical case for presumed consent laws, required
request as a public policy approach consciously
reflects a sensitivity to the key values of voluntarism,
altruism, and informed choice that have formed the
core of American moral and legal thinking about
organ and tissue procurement since the creation
of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act in 1968.
The most persuasive argument that Martyn,
Wright, and Clark are able to muster against required
request legislation is that if the laws are effective
they will have adverse fiscal consequences. Transplants are expensive and if they are financed by
public funds there will be less money available to
meet the legitimate health care needs of others.
But is the cost of having a greater supply of organs
and tissues available for transplant really a reason
not to try and obtain organs and tissues? Should
the answer to such a question hinge on cost, or,
rather, on the steps needed to assure access to
efficacious medical care for all Americans with
medical needs?
If overall expenditure is the standard by which
our moral obligation to those with terminal illness
is to be measured then many other Americans will
have to yield their access to medical care to others.
Those with AIDS, terminal cancers, head injuries,
spinal cord injuries, and severe congenital anomalies
impose a far greater burden on the national treasury
than anything organ and tissue transplants could
pose under even the most optimistic scenarios
concerning required request. Surely the correct
ethical answer to public policy regarding organ and
tissue procurement is to seek ways to reduce the
costs of transplants rather than to ignore the fact
that thousands of Americans die or remain severely

disabled simply for want of an organ or tissue donor.
Martyn, Wright, and Clark conclude their critique
of required request with a call for a redirection of
efforts to educate the American public about organ
and tissue donation. Public education is surely
commendable, but it has little to do with the primary
difficulties confronting required request laws. The
major problems are the unavailability of data on
the size of the pool of organ and tissue donors,
the failure of states and the federal government to
support legislation with adequate professional
education, and the failure of the transplant
community to address the audience most in need
of education and persuasion where matters of organ
and tissue donation are concerned-health care
professionals.
The transplant community has taken great solace
over the years in the view that the public's lack of
awareness and understanding of organ and tissue
donation is the primary obstacle to broader support
for organ procurement. But if opinion surveys are
to be believed, the public knows fill well about the
need for transplants.
The public continues to evince a strong interest
in organ and tissue donation although that interest
has declined somewhat in recent years. This may
result from a sudden onslaught of ignorance but,
I believe that rather than moral callousness on the
part of the citizenry, other factors are responsible,
factors far more disquieting to the transplant
community.
It is health care professionals, not the general
public, who are in desperate need of education about
their duties where organ and tissue procurement
is concerned. They need to be taught how to make
requests, or, if they are too discomfitted by death,
to yield authority over matters pertaining to
procurement to others more adept at dealing with
this harsh reality.
In enacting required request legislation, our
society has indicated its collective desire that people
routinely be given the option of organ and tissue
donation as a last act of respect for the dead and
their families and as an expression of concern for
those who will die unless more organs and tissues
are made available. It has not yet put its money
where its ethical concerns are in the form of
resources to train health care professionals to feel
comfortable rather than angry in discharging their
obligations to the dead and those who are dying.
Until these resources are forthcoming and directed
to the audience of health care professionals where
they are most needed, the ethical, clinical, and legal
impact of required request will remain unknown.

